We follow the duopoly framework with di¤erentiated products as in Singh and Vives (1984) and Zanchettin (2006) and examine the welfare e¤ects of a merger between two asymmetric …rms. We …nd that for quantity competition, the merger increases total welfare if the cost asymmetry falls into a speci…c range. Furthermore, this parameter range widens if the products are closer substitutes. On the other hand, mergers are never welfare enhancing in this setting when …rms compete in prices.
Introduction
In this paper, we focus on di¤erentiated goods and derive the analytical condition for a merger to enhance welfare. The possibility of welfare enhancing merger is not new. Textbook examples show that for homogenous goods, when the cost di¤erence is substantial, a merger can increase social welfare by improving allocative e¢ ciency in the Cournot equilibrium. In a homogenous product set-up, Farrell and Shapiro (1990) provide su¢ cient Flavio Menezes acknowledges the …nancial support of the Australian Research Council (Grant DP 0663768). We thank Luke Boosey for useful comments.
conditions for pro…table mergers to raise welfare with general demand and cost conditions.
We follow the set up in Singh and Vives (1984) and Zanchettin (2006) and derive the analytical condition for a merger to enhance welfare for markets with di¤erentiated products and asymmetric …rms. Moreover, we obtain the welfare enhancing condition for Cournot competition with homogenous goods in the limit, i.e., as goods become perfect substitutes. In the same framework, we show that if …rms compete in prices, mergers always reduce total welfare. The positive welfare e¤ect of merger comes from improved e¢ ciency by allocating more output to the more e¢ cient …rm.
As Zanchettin (2006) points out, the e¢ cient …rm always produces more under price competition than under quantity competition. It follows then that the e¢ ciency gains from a merger are lower under price competition than under quantity competition. Moreover, unlike quantity competition, the increase in pro…ts due to e¢ ciency gains under price competition is not enough to outweigh the decline in consumer surplus from higher prices.
We present the model set up in the next section and solve …rst for the optimisation problem the merged entity faces. Sections 3 and 4 analyse the quantity competition and price competition games in turn and derive the welfare results of mergers. While the main body of this paper deals with substitute goods, Section 5 brie ‡y discusses the case of complementary goods. The …nal section provides some concluding remarks.
The Model
To facilitate comparison, we use the same notation as Zanchettin (2006).
Consider a two-sector model with one monopoly …rm in each sector. The inverse demand curves for the two goods are
and
The parameter measures the degree of product di¤erentiation. If = 0, the demand for the two goods are independent. For the main body of the paper, we assume that the two goods are substitutes, 0
1.
We assume that the marginal costs of production in markets 1 and 2 are equal to c 1 and c 2 , respectively, and that there are no …xed costs. Following
Zanchettin (2006), we de…ne an index a to measure the asymmetry between the two …rms.
De…nition 1 Let a ( 1 c 1 ) ( 2 c 2 ) and 1 c 1 = 1. Without loss of generality, assume a 0.
The index a summarises the asymmetry between the two markets and …rms. For a = 0, two …rms are symmetric. For a 1 2 , the asymmetry between the …rms is so large that …rm 2 does not exert any competitive pressure on …rm 1, and in equilibrium …rm 1 sets its quantity at the monopoly level, q 1 = q M 1 , and q 2 = 0. That is, the limit price required for …rm 1 to drive …rm 2 out of the market is greater than the monopoly price …rm 1 would like to charge at q 2 = 0. This is explained in more detail in Sections 3 and 4 for quantity game and price game respectively. We focus on the case a 1 2 in this paper.
Note that for the merged entity, without strategic interaction, setting quantity is equivalent to setting price. Before analysing the duopoly game, we solve the merged entity's optimisation problem:
The …rst order conditions yield
We will denote by Q the quantity choices of the merged entity and by q the quantity choices of each of the …rms when they are in competition.
For a < 1 , the solution is interior:
This gives the merged entity's pro…t equal to
and the resulting consumer surplus is
For a 1 , the …rst order conditions yield Q 2 = 0 and Q 1 = 
Quantity competition
If the two …rms are in competition, each …rm i solves max q i (p i c i ) q i . This yields the following best response function
For a 1 2 , both …rms produce positive output. This gives
The resulting pro…ts are
This gives consumer surplus
Notice that, as analysed above, for a 1 , the merged entity would choose to produce only good 1. We plot the di¤erent cases, depending on whether or not there is a corner solution, in the following diagram. Our analysis focuses on cases 1 and 2. In particular, we will show that it is possible for a merger to increase welfare in case 1.
Welfare Results
For the entire parameter range, as expected, industry pro…t always increases and consumer surplus decreases after the merger. In any two-to-one merger, the merged entity can always mimic the pre-merger behaviour of the …rms and, therefore, pro…ts have to be (weakly) higher. For substitute goods, this means (weakly) higher price and, therefore, lower consumer surplus. However, we show below that under quantity competition, for a given parameter range, two-to-one mergers can be welfare improving; the increase in pro…ts dominate the fall in consumer surplus.
Proposition 1 For the parameter range,
(2 )(12 4 3 2 ) (24 2 2 ) a 1 2 , the total surplus increases post merger under quantity competition.
Proof. For 1 a 1 2 , if …rms are in competition, q 1 = q C 1 and q 2 = q C 2 . This gives
The resulting consumer surplus is
On the other hand, for the merged entity, Q 1 = The total surplus post merger increases if
This holds for
Finally, note that
For 1 a 1 2 , the total market output decreases post merger,
, and the average market up increases as
where p 1 q C 1 ; q C 2 and p 2 q C 1 ; q C 2 are the prevailing market prices when …rms set quantities equal to q C 1 and q C 2 respectively. Therefore, consumer surplus decreases. The possibility of welfare gain comes from the e¢ ciency gain of shutting down production of the high cost product. It follows that there is welfare gain only if the asymmetry between …rms is su¢ ciently large.
As emphasised previously, for a > 1 2 , …rm 2 is so relatively ine¢ cient that in either duopoly competition or post-merger, q 2 = 0. A merger of the two …rms in this case has no e¤ect on market outcomes.
The possibility of a welfare enhancing merger only occurs in Case 1 where both …rms produce positive amounts if they are in competition while the merged entity only produces good 1. The e¢ ciency gain from shutting down the ine¢ cient production outweighs the loss resulting from a higher market price.
Note that the band for a welfare increasing merger is equal to
As the products become closer substitutes, the parameter range for welfare enhancing merger widens:
Since homogenous good Cournot competition is a special case of our differentiated products framework with = 1, we have the following corollary. While two-to-one mergers can be welfare enhancing under quantity competition, the next section shows that this is not the case for price competition.
Price competition
From the inverse demand curves given in Equations 1 and 2, we obtain the demand curves q 1 =
. The …rm's optimisation problem can be written as max p i (p i c i ) q i . For p 1 > c 1 and p 2 > c 2 , this yields the following best response functions:
This yields the interior solutions
(1 a) (2 + ) (2 ) and p
Note that the assumption a 0 implies that p 1 c 1 p 2 c 2 .
In contrast to quantity setting game, for di¤erentiated Bertrand, the e¢ cient …rm may be able to charge a low enough price to drive the other …rm out of the market even if a < 1 2 . This will occur when q 2 0 or
To enforce this price below c 2 , …rm 1 needs to choose a price such that:
When p 1 1 1 a , q 2 = 0. For q 2 = 0, the unconstrained pro…t maximising price for …rm 1 is p 1 = 1 +c 1 2 . Therefore, in this case, …rm 1's best reply is to charge p 1 = min
For …rm 2, being the ine¢ cient …rm, it charges according to the best response function speci…ed above or if the best response prescribes below marginal cost pricing, it sets p 2 = c 2 . That is, it charges p 2 = max n c 2 ;
The kink in the best response occurs when
Note that 1 + c 1 2
Therefore, as under quantity competition, for a 1 2 , …rm 1 acts as an unconstrained monopoly and charges
and p 2 c 2 = q 2 = 0.
For 1 2 2 a 1 2 , the equilibrium is that
Firm 1 charges a price just low enough to drive …rm 2 out of the market.
Zanchettin (2006) terms the pricing behaviour in this parameter range the limit-pricing equilibrium. Note that in this parameter range, for quantity competition, both …rms produce positive output. The ability of …rm 1 to exercise limit pricing is the key for Zanchettin's result that the e¢ cient …rm prefers price competition.
For a < 1 2 2 , we have the usual interior solution for di¤erentiated
Bertrand with the equilibrium p 1 = p B 1 and p 2 = p B 2 . We distinguish di¤er-ent cases by if the equilibrium outcome is given by interior solution, corner solution, or limit pricing behaviour. The di¤erent cases are plotted in the following diagram.
Welfare Results
While two-to-one mergers can be welfare enhancing under quantity competition, the next result shows that this is not the case for price competition. 
This holds since in this case
Case 2: 1 a 1 2 2 :
If …rms 1 and 2 are in competition, p 1 = p B 1 and p 2 = p B 2 . This gives
Consumer surplus is
The merged entity produces Q 1 = 1 2 and Q 2 = 0. The total surplus goes down post merger if
This holds since
Case 3: a 1 :
If …rms 1 and 2 are in competition, p 1 = p B 1 and p 2 = p B 2 . The merged entity produces Q 1 = Q 1 and Q 2 = Q 2 as given in Equation 5.
The total surplus goes down post merger if 1 , total welfare always goes down post merger in this case.
As pointed out by Zanchettin (2006), the e¢ cient …rm produces more under price competition than under quantity competition over the entire parameter space. This is the most apparent in the limit pricing range where the ine¢ cient …rm is driven out of the market under price competition while it remains active under quantity competition. Therefore, the e¢ ciency gain from a merger is lower under price competition and not su¢ cient to outweigh the decline in consumer surplus post merger.
Complementary Goods
When the two goods are complements, for the merged …rm, the …rst order conditions with respect to good i increases in the quantity of good j. If the …rms compete in quantities, the best responses are upward sloping. There is no corner solution and in equilibrium Q 1 = Q 1 , Q 2 = Q 2 , q 1 = q C 1 , and q 2 = q C 2 as given in Equations 5 and 9. When …rms compete in prices, similarly, there is no corner solution and both …rms produce positive amounts in equilibrium. Note that p B 2 > c 2 for < 0.
Remark 1 When goods are complements, the ine¢ cient …rm always produces positive output in equilibrium. Both industry pro…t and consumer surplus go up after the merger.
When goods are complements, …rms produce too little since they do not take into consideration the positive externality their increased production has on the other …rm. Therefore, after the merger, once the externality is internalised, production of each good increases and industry pro…t increases.
Consumer surplus also increases due to expanded output. Note that for this to hold, we do not require that goods are perfect complements. This is true even for an arbitrarily small degree of complementarity.
Finally, the welfare comparison between price and quantity competition for the two …rms has been analysed by Zanchettin (2006) for the case of substitute goods. Zanchettin found that price competition could give the e¢ cient …rm higher pro…t if the cost di¤erence is high and the products are close substitutes. Next we extend his analysis to the case of complements.
Remark 2 Both …rms as well as consumers prefer price competition to quantity competition when goods are complements.
Proof. See Appendix.
When goods are complements, the prices are higher, and quantity produced lower, under quantity competition than under price competition. The ranking of the output under di¤erent competition modes is: q C i < q i p B i < Q i , where i = 1; 2, q C i represents the interior solution when …rms compete in quantity, q i p B i is the output level under price competition given that the equilibrium price is q B i , and Q i is the output for the merged entity.
Conclusions
In this paper, we develop the analytical condition for a merger of duopolists to be welfare enhancing if …rms compete in quantities. A merger between goods which are substitutes increases social welfare if the cost di¤erence is substantial. Furthermore, the parameter range for the merger to be welfare enhancing widens if the products are closer substitutes. If …rms compete in prices, on the other hand, a merger between duopolists is never welfare improving. Finally, we show that mergers are always welfare improving for any (even very small) degree of complementarity.
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